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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
In standard  public  ﬁnance  theory  a government’s  cost  of  borrowing  depends  on  the  common  beliefs  held
by rational  investors  regarding  default  risk.  We  advance  understanding  of  the  effects  of  diverse  beliefs
and overconﬁdence  among  investors  in their  ability  to  assess  the  sovereign’s  creditworthiness.  Theoret-
ically, we  ﬁnd  that  demand  for insurance  against  default  is  positively  related  to the  absolute  difference
between  the  market  price  of sovereign  risk  and  the  risk  forecasted  by the economy’s  fundamentals.  We
ﬁnd  preliminary  support  for this  prediction  in  a  newly  available  dataset  on  sovereign  credit  default  swaps
(CDSs):  after  controlling  for  the  size  of  the  public  debt,  the  absolute  size  of  the  gap  between  the  actual
and  forecasted  spreads  is  positively  related  to  the  value  of  outstanding  CDSs.
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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. Introduction
In this paper we present a theory and evidence of heteroge-
eous investor expectations and excessive trade in the market
or insurance against sovereign default. The motivation for the
tudy is the diversity of default risk pricing faced by developed
ountries and emerging markets after the 2008–2009 ﬁnancial
risis. For instance, the cost of insuring against default by the
uro area’s peripheral members remains higher than the insurance
ost for several ﬁscally comparable emerging markets (Aizenman
t al., forthcoming). To explain how economies with similar fun-
amentals can lead to different prices for default risk we present a
odel where agents are overconﬁdent in their ability to beat the
arket. As a result, agents with a favorable signal (“optimists”)
egarding default risk supply insurance to the remaining agents
 We would like to thank two anonymous referees for useful comments and
uggestions.
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j5@soas.ac.uk, yothin.jinjarak@gmail.com (Y. Jinjarak), manachaya.u@chula.ac.th
M.  Uruyos).
b
m
1
t
l
c
u
a
t
W
t
572-3089/$ – see front matter ©  2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2012.11.007“pessimists”). The model predicts that agents trade more insur-
nce when the market-assessed default risk is either higher or
ower than the forecasted risk. We  ﬁnd evidence consistent with
hese predictions using a new dataset on sovereign credit default
waps (CDSs): after controlling for the size of the public debt, the
bsolute value of the market-forecasted spread difference is posi-
ively related to the stock of outstanding CDSs. Due to the limited
umber of observations and variables in the dataset, however, we
refer to interpret the ﬁndings as tentative and leave more thor-
ugh empirical testing to future work.
The paper’s key theoretical assumption that investors are over-
onﬁdent in their ability to beat the market follows the literature in
ehavioral ﬁnance linking psychological factors to irrational invest-
ent behavior and inefﬁcient ﬁnancial markets (Barberis et al.,
998; Chui et al., 2010; De Bondt and Thaler, 1995). According
o Odean (1998, p. 1889), who  also provides an overview of the
iterature in both psychology and economics, “A review of the psy-
hology literature on inference ﬁnds that people systematically
nderweight abstract, statistical, and highly relevant information,
nd overweight salient, anecdotal, and extreme information.” For
he purpose of formal modeling, Odean (1998) follows Kyle and
ang (1997), Daniel et al. (1998) and Wang (1998) in assuming
hat overconﬁdence implies investors overestimate the precision
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f their information. More precisely, in all four papers investors
verestimate the precision of their private signals concerning an
sset value.1 In Benos and Alexandros (1998) they overestimate the
recision of every market participant’s signal. We  instead assume
nvestors underestimate the precision of signals received by others
nd therefore believe that the market price they observe may be
isleading. Equivalently, they might know the precision of the sig-
als of others, but underestimate others’ ability to interpret and act
ppropriately on the signals. In other words, we  assume investors
nderweight statistical information (the precision of the market
rice), whereas previous work assumes they overweight anecdotal
nformation (the precision of private signals).2 Investors in this
aper believe they are rational, but that the other investors and
he market may  be irrational.
The paper also relates to the ﬁnance literature on CDSs. The pri-
ing of CDSs and their effects on borrowing costs have attracted
igniﬁcant attention since the global crisis of 2008–2009. A com-
licating factor is that most CDS contracts are traded over the
ounter (OTC) and various trading motives tend to intertwine (e.g.,
ounter-party risk, hedging, and speculation). Ang and Longstaff
2011) ﬁnd that systemic risk components in CDS spreads are
ess correlated across states in the US than across the US and the
uro countries. The difference in correlations is strongly associated
ith the systemic effects of global ﬁnancial market variables. Che
nd Sethi (2011) show that naked CDS trading can divert a CDS
eller’s capital into collateral for a speculative position, and away
rom potential borrowers, thereby increasing borrowing costs and
he likelihood of default. In both Che and Sethi (2011) and this
aper the reason agents contract on CDSs is their heterogeneous
eliefs regarding sovereign default risk. The papers differ since
he and Sethi endogenize the level of sovereign borrowing but do
ot explain why investors hold heterogeneous beliefs. In contrast,
e take the sovereign debt stock as a given and derive investor
eliefs from an underlying information environment. In particu-
ar, we show that investor beliefs can remain diverse even when
he market price is fully revealing, that is, it summarizes investors’
oint information. Another difference to Che and Sethi (2011) is
hat we are able to test our model in a new dataset on sovereign
DSs. Geanakoplos (2009) shows that heterogeneous beliefs can
nteract with leverage to increase the volatility of asset prices. The
eason is that assets are bought by the most optimistic investors,
nd therefore increasing leverage increases the optimism of the
arginal investor. Leveraging thus increases asset demand before
he asset’s true value becomes revealed and demand systemati-
ally drops. Like Che and Sethi (2011), Geanakoplos (2009) focuses
n the consequences rather than causes of heterogeneous beliefs.
inally, Bruneau et al. (2012) link CDS mispricing to investor senti-
ents in a multiple-equilibrium model of the European sovereign
ebt crisis. Their paper may  suggest that the interaction between
iverse investor beliefs and multiple equilibriums, or between mis-
ricing in related asset markets, is an important avenue for future
esearch.
Both the model and the evidence in the paper contrast
ith models of sovereign risk based on common rather than
1 Nikolic (2011) ﬁnds evidence consistent with the predictions of Daniel et al.
1998).
2 Odean (1998, pp. 1894–1895) brieﬂy discusses our modeling approach as an
lternative to his own. Although mathematically underweighting the information
f  others or overweighting one’s own information may  yield similar results, at
east in the simplest models, they are conceptually different sources of inefﬁciency.
ddressing underweighting of statistical information may require convincing
gents to “trust the statistics”. Addressing overweighting of private information
ay require them to be skeptical of what they hear from friends and colleagues,
tc.
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eterogeneous investor beliefs. In fundamentals-based models of
efault risk (Acharya et al., 2011; Aizenman et al., forthcoming) the
iskiness of debt should increase insurance demand when agents
re risk-averse. However, insurance demand then depends on the
isk of default, and not on the difference between the market and
orecasted default risks emphasized in the present paper. In mul-
iple equilibrium-based models of default risk (Calvo, 1988; Cole
nd Kehoe, 2000) the market-assessed risk generally differs from
he forecasted risk, since investors may  not choose the equilibrium
he forecaster expected.3 However, again insurance demand should
epend on the actual default risk and not the forecasting error for
hat risk. It is true that if the market chooses a high-rather than
ow risk equilibrium the market risk may  exceed the forecasted risk
n that case the market-forecasted spread difference may  be cor-
elated with high actual risk. However, in that case the converse
hould also hold: economies where investors choose a low-risk
quilibrium, and therefore the market risk is below the forecasted
isk, should have safer sovereign debt and occasion less insurance
emand. We  ﬁnd the opposite in the data: even economies where
he market-assessed risk is below the fundamentals-forecasted
pread have higher insurance demand than economies where the
arket and forecasted risks are similar.
In the remainder of the paper, Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
ion 3 presents evidence linking the gap between market-assessed
nd forecasted sovereign default risk to demand for insurance
sing a novel dataset on credit default swaps. The conclusion is in
ection 4.
. Theoretical model
We assume a government with a stock of outstanding debt B and
 continuum of symmetric risk-neutral investors with ﬁnite liquid-
ty. These investors can potentially trade insurance against default
n the form of credit default swaps (CDSs). Because a CDS trader
eed not be a debt holder the model allows for naked swaps. The
ebtor’s fundamentals are either good (g) or bad (b) with proba-
ility 0.5 of each. Good fundamentals imply default risk dg and bad
undamentals imply default risk db > dg. For simplicity there is zero
epayment in the default state. The timing is that each investor
eceives an i.i.d. private signal regarding the country’s fundamen-
als. Subsequently they can contract on CDSs. The signal is correct
ith probability p > 0.5, that is, pr(g|G) = pr(b|B) = p > 0.5, where
(B) denotes a good (bad) signal. Due to the law of large num-
ers, the proportion of agents receiving a correct signal is also p.
e denote the market price of insurance against default – the CDS
pread – when fundamentals are good g and the spread when
undamentals are bad b. We solve for these prices below. Finally,
e assume that agents are overconﬁdent in their ability to beat the
arket. Speciﬁcally when the market price of insurance is g (b),
uggesting fundamentals are good (bad), agents believe the market
s wrong about the sovereign risk with probability 0 < 1 −  < 0.5.
or example, they may  believe that a stochastic fraction of other
nvestors q ∈ (0,  1) will irrationally interpret a good signal as a bad
ignal or vice versa because of behavioral biases, or because they are
usy and do not have time to process the information adequately. In
hat case, while the actual fraction receiving the correct signal is p,
he fraction assessing the risk correctly is only pq + (1 − p)(1 − q):
3 For example, if investors believe the default risk is high they will charge a high
isk-adjusted interest rate. The high interest rate may  increase the government’s
ebt burden and therefore default risk enough to justify investors’ initial expec-
ations. Conversely, if investors do not expect default they will charge a zero risk
remium. If the low interest rate brings the actual risk to zero then against investor
xpectations are justiﬁed.
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of the debt in the following columns. Column (3) provides the mar-
ket spread of sovereign credit default swap (CDS) contracts as of
December 2010.4 The CDS spread indicates the quarterly payments32 T. Janus et al. / Journal of Fin
he fraction whose signal and interpretation are both correct, pq,
lus the fraction who fail on both accounts, (1 − p)(1 − q). In turn,
he chance that most market participants will act based on the sig-
al most of them received is prob(pq + (1 − p)(1 − q) > 5) =  < 1.
ince the market price depends on how the majority acts, as we
how below, each investor believes the market is wrong, and she
an potentially beat it, with probability (1 − ).
.1. Outcome with rational investors
With rational investors the law of large numbers implies that
he market price of insurance is perfectly informative: a market
rice of g (b) implies that a proportion p > 0.5 of the agents
eceived the good signal. Therefore the fundamentals are good with
robability one. Since the market is always right any rational agent
gnores her private signal. Thus, with good fundamentals the CDS
pread must be g = dg and with bad fundamentals b = db > dg .
ince the insurance price is fair and agents are symmetric and risk-
eutral they perceive no gain to CDS trading.
.2. Outcome with overconﬁdent investors
When investors are overconﬁdent they think that the market
s only right with probability  < 1. Thus, when the fundamentals
re good (the argument is symmetric when fundamentals are bad)
n agent’s belief in good fundamentals depends on her signal:
r(g|g, G, ) = p
p + (1 − )(1 − p) ≡ q(
g, G, ) (1)
r(g|g, B, ) = (1 − p)
(1 − p) + (1 − )p ≡ q(
g, B, ) < q(g, G, ),
(2)
here (1) is the perceived probability that fundamentals are good
iven a good signal and a market price reﬂecting most other
nvestors got the good signal. Similarly, (2) is the perceived proba-
ility fundamentals are bad given a bad signal and the market price
eﬂecting most other investors got the good signal. The inequality
n (2) follows from p > 0.5 and implies that a worse private sig-
al makes investors more pessimistic. Investors with bad and good
ignals – henceforth denoted pessimists with superscript p and opti-
ists with superscript o – will value insurance against default as
ollows:
o(g) = q(g, G, )dg + (1 − q(g, G, ))db, (3)
p(g) = q(g, B, )dg + (1 − q(g, B, ))db > o(g), (4)
here (3) is the subjective likelihood of default given the bad signal
nd therefore the perceived likelihood of good fundamentals in Eq.
1). Similarly, (4) is the likelihood of default with perceived like-
ihood of good fundamentals (2). The last inequality uses dg < db
nd q(g, B, ) < q(g, G, ) from (2).
Since optimists value insurance less, they are willing to sell it to
he pessimists. The perceived gain to insurance trade is
p(g) − o(g) =
(
(1 − p)
(1 − p) + (1 − )pd
g
+
(
1 − (1 − p)
(1 − p) + (1 − )p
)
db
)
−
(
p
p + (1 − )(1 − p)d
g
(
p
) )
+ 1 −
p + (1 − )(1 − p) d
b > 0 (5)
here the inequality uses dg < db and that the weight on the ﬁrst
erm is less in the ﬁrst compared to the second brackets since
o
o
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 > 0.5. The perceived gain to trade only vanishes if investors stop
elieving they can beat the market ( = 1).
Proceeding symmetrically shows that in the bad-fundamentals
tate pessimists and optimists value insurance at
o(b) = (q(b, G, )dg + (1 − q(b, G, ))db. (6)
p(b) = q(b, B, )db + (1 − q(b, B, ))dg > o(b) (7)
The inequality in (7) implies that there is again a perceived gain
rom optimists selling insurance to pessimists.
The price of insurance, the public information-based forecast
rror, and insurance trade
Due to p > 0.5, in the good-fundamentals state optimistic insur-
nce sellers compete for pessimistic insurance buyers. The clearing
rice is therefore the optimists’ reservation price or g = o(g).
onversely, in the bad-fundamentals state the price is the pes-
imists’ reservation price or b = p(b) > g . On the other hand,
he best price prediction an econometrician – or other agents
ith access only to public information – can make is the average
g + p)/2 = (o(g) + p(b))/2. The gap between the market and
orecasted CDS spreads – the forecast error – is therefore
o(g) − 
o(g) + p(b)
2
= 
o(g) − b(b)
2
= (d
g − db)( + p − 1)/2
p + (1 − )(1 − p) < 0 (8)
n the good state and
b(b) − 
o(g) + p(b)
2
= 
p(b) − o(g)
2
= (d
b − dg)( + p − 1)/2
p + (1 − )(1 − p) > 0 (9)
n the bad state. As investors become more realistic about
heir ability to outsmart the market (so  increases) two
hings happen. First, the absolute size of the forecast errors
8) and (9) decrease: (∂/∂)((db − dg)( + p − 1)/(p + (1 − )(1 −
))) < 0 ⇔ 0 < 2p(1 − p). Second, the gain to insurance trade
n the left hand side of (5) (and the symmetric expres-
ion for the bad state) decreases: we  have dg < db and the
eight on dg increases in the ﬁrst brackets and decreases in
he second, that is (∂/∂)((1 − p)/((1 − p) + (1 − )p)) < 0 <
∂/∂)(p/(p + (1 − )(1 − p))). In the limiting case of rational
nvestors ( → 1) the forecast errors are minimized at (dg + db)/2
nd there is no gain to insurance trade.
In sum, the model predicts that the forecast error of agents with
ccess only to public information should be positively correlated
ith gains to trade in insurance against default. We  now proceed
o test this prediction in a new dataset on sovereign credit default
waps.
. Empirical evidence
Table 1 reports statistics for sovereign debt, bond yields, and
utstanding sovereign CDS contracts for ﬁfty countries with avail-
ble data for 2010–2011. We  report several proxies for the riskiness4 The CDS prices are based on London closing values of ﬁve-year tenor contracts as
f  31st December 2010. CMA  Datavision compiles the CDS values from a consortium
f  thirty-ﬁve major buy-side participants in the swap markets. The sovereign CDS
preads are priced in basis points, with a basis point equal to $1000 to insure $10
illion of debt.
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Table 1
Statistics of government debt, sovereign interest rate, and market outstanding sovereign credit default swap contracts. This table provides data and statistics for main variables in the theoretical model of Section 2. The total
government debt data are from the latest International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook statistics on gross government debt as of December 2010. Debt/tax is the average ratio of 2008–2010 total government debt
relative  to average previous tax base in the previous 5 years. Market CDS spreads are based on the London closing values of 5-year tenor sovereign CDS contracts, in basis points. Like CDS, a market probability of sovereign
default  is from CMA  Datavision. Forecasted CDS spreads are based on the dynamic panel regression of market CDS spreads on fundamental variables, including lagged CDS, TED spread, trade openness, inﬂation, ﬁscal space; see
Aizenman et al. (forthcoming) for detailed estimation. Sovereign bond yields are based on JP Morgan series (EMBI Global Diversiﬁed and Government Bond Index (GBI)) for the middle-income countries and emerging markets;
from  OECD statistics (10-year bonds; stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=86) for non-Euro OECD; and from Eurostat for the Euro-area countries (ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/long/html/index.en.html). The CDS turnover and
notional  amounts of CDS outstanding are based on the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC).
Income group Country ISO Govt. debt
(bil US$)
Debt tax Sovereign interest rate: December 2010 CDS turnover
January–March 2011
Notional CDS outstanding as of March 2011
Market CDS Forecasted CDS Pr (default) Bond yld Trades (US$)/day #/day Gross (US$) Net (US$) Contracts
Middle
income
Argentina ARG 177 2.481 602.4 466.4 35.4 35.4  175,000,000 17 56,559,512,794 2,166,184,627 5975
Brazil BRA 1381 1.989 110.8 181.3 7.6 9.7 575,000,000 36 171,195,085,796 15,670,582,457 11,708
Bulgaria BGR 9 0.521 247.2 170.8 16.2 8.2 50,000,000 5 18,715,005,688 982,213,505 1844
China CHN 1041 1.075 67.8 106.1 6.0 6.7  27,500,000 2 36,618,649,311 5,839,903,940 3862
Colombia COL 104 1.865 113.0 160.5 7.8 11.4 100,000,000 7 34,201,146,025 2,365,600,280 3255
Indonesia IDN 190 2.384 128.4 301.3 8.9 13.6 125,000,000 16 33,055,277,733 2,675,182,171 4140
Kazakhstan KAZ 16 0.369 178.0 310.6 12.0 13.6  15,000,000 3 19,898,273,350 993,046,717 1783
Lebanon LBN 54 9.909 298.1 361.2 19.2 11.6  5,000,000 1 2,144,011,400 473,950,000 352
Lithuania LTU 14 1.381 251.2 211.8 16.4 15.9 5,000,000 1 5,778,279,058 633,848,170 648
Malaysia MYS 129 3.342 72.7 99.2 6.4 8.8 50,000,000 4 16,959,086,298 1,315,738,355 2168
Morocco MAR 52 2.104 125.2 40.3 8.5 – – – – – –
Panama PAN 11 3.864 99.5 206.8 6.9 11.1  10,000,000 1 7,588,469,965 861,912,924 1014
Peru PER 37 1.759 113.0 97.9 7.8 11.6 100,000,000 7 24,653,526,203 2,118,735,718 2444
Philippines PHL 89 3.587 125.6 212.8 8.7 13.4 125,000,000 12 54,288,178,757 2,948,701,507 6102
Romania ROM 57 1.034 290.2 220.2 18.7 7.1  12,500,000 1 17,020,407,858 1,086,564,853 1779
Russia RUS 145 0.274 145.5 333.2 10.0 8.6  225,000,000 20 98,198,976,333 4,498,633,687 6841
South Africa ZAF 128 1.164 124.3 227.8 8.6 9.6  100,000,000 8 41,041,447,526 2,510,683,086 4353
Thailand THA 141 2.576 98.5 33.5 8.5 17.4  50,000,000 5 15,902,511,915 1,212,544,143 2359
Tunisia TUN 18 2.043 119.7 282.5 8.2 5.5  7,500,000 1 2,140,341,965 334,251,796 337
Ukraine UKR 55 0.889 509.5 742.4 30.6 34.3  50,000,000 6 42,616,048,244 1,288,841,677 3343
Venezuela VEN 112 2.479 1009.6 1118.2 51.4 16.1  150,000,000 15 57,040,384,893 2,397,460,608 5586
Vietnam VNM 55 2.433 299.6 432.5 19.4 9.8 50,000,000 5 8,576,331,708 805,605,600 1256
High
(non-OECD)
Croatia HRV 24 1.705 256.0 97.4 16.8 3.2  20,000,000 3 7,629,252,673 754,808,228 1051
Qatar QAT 23 1.009 88.5 155.1 6.1 . 50,000,000 8 7,967,769,213 1,163,199,848 1137
Euro Zone
Periphery
Greece GRC 434 3.983 1026.5 266.8 58.8 12.0 225,000,000 20 86,824,391,218 5,613,859,753 5003
Ireland IRL 196 2.280 619.2 188.3 41.2 8.5  175,000,000 16 51,415,185,361 4,275,225,085 3087
Italy ITA 2446 2.695 238.0 66.5 19.3 4.6  900,000,000 45 304,508,105,319 26,481,392,307 9216
Portugal PRT 191 2.183 497.3 58.4 35.9 6.5 400,000,000 27 81,151,810,190 7,331,017,950 4325
Spain ESP 848 1.448 347.7 48.9 26.7 5.4  1,000,000,000 70 171,126,342,971 18,792,383,373 8290
OECD
(non-OECD)
Australia AUS 276 0.588 50.1 55.7 4.4 5.3  125,000,000 10 14,512,576,400 2,699,942,020 1284
Chile CHL 18 0.307 84.1 84.2 5.9 6.1  7,500,000 1 4,636,609,439 619,970,114 471
Czech CZE 76 0.947 91.1 44.5 6.3 3.9 12,500,000 1 10,407,634,239 866,617,684 838
Denmark DNK 138 0.866 45.9 48.0 4.0 3.0 17,500,000 2 11,839,635,026 2,271,170,649 640
Hungary HUN 104 2.011 378.0 169.7 23.6 7.9  175,000,000 21 63,722,175,341 3,821,105,227 5204
Iceland ISL 12 2.193 265.0 558.4 19.2 3.8 7,500,000 1 7,449,823,082 908,084,379 1118
Israel ISR 166 2.226 114.7 99.7 7.9 4.5  50,000,000 7 9,534,350,984 1,359,370,660 1150
Japan JPN 12,025 7.630 72.3 32.4 6.4 1.1  275,000,000 38 51,040,495,200 7,497,438,938 5664
Korea KOR 311 1.231 93.9 101.1 8.1 4.4 200,000,000 22 51,504,469,955 4,282,794,091 5716
Mexico MEX 444 2.381 112.8 170.8 7.8 10.5  375,000,000 26 122,392,303,866 8,434,776,927 9544
Norway NOR 225 1.273 23.2 39.0 2.1 3.4  10,000,000 1 7,176,059,400 957,236,900 325
Poland POL 261 1.525 143.9 87.0 9.8 6.0 100,000,000 8 33,479,817,897 2,277,739,929 2918
Sweden SWE 181 0.832 34.3 14.1 3.0 3.2  50,000,000 3 17,313,354,975 2,968,217,192 963
Turkey TUR 309 1.725 140.0 283.2 9.6 12.0 400,000,000 29 141,725,714,710 7,077,418,209 8516
Euro (Excl.
Periphery)
Austria AUT 263 1.567 100.6 47.4 8.6 3.4  150,000,000 8 44,919,565,100 6,164,085,006 1903
Belgium BEL 452 2.137 219.8 88.1 17.9 4.0 225,000,000 18 40,919,444,224 6,804,384,759 2126
France FRA 2,176 1.746 107.3 33.3 9.2 3.3  575,000,000 34 88,696,858,059 18,857,132,131 4545
Germany DEU 2,652 2.055 59.1 22.0 5.2 2.9  325,000,000 13 84,617,150,287 16,535,428,329 2678
Netherlands NLD 499 1.583 62.8 60.1 5.5 3.2 75,000,000 4 19,967,140,882 2,849,100,115 1003
Slovakia SVK 37 1.158 82.3 9.7 7.1 4.1  10,000,000 1 10,082,517,579 814,328,286 744
Slovenia SVN 18 0.833 76.9 30.2 6.7 4.1  7,500,000 1 4,463,195,056 765,865,011 359
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tig. 1. Sovereign default and market insurance. This ﬁgure provides a scatter-plot 
ross  CDS outstanding relative to the size of total government outstanding debt at
illion  of US$). Table 1 provides the statistics and detailed descriptions of data sour
hat must be paid by the buyer of a CDS to the seller for the con-
ingent claim in the case of a credit event (i.e. non-payment, forced
estructuring) of sovereign debt. It is therefore a good proxy for the
arket price of insurance. Emerging markets and the peripheral
uro-area countries of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain,
re at the high end of the risk spectrum.
In column (4) we provide forecasted CDS spreads based on
acroeconomic fundamentals, including the lagged CDS spread,
he TED spread, trade openness, inﬂation, and the debt/tax
ase ratio. These forecasts are drawn from Aizenman et al.
forthcoming), to whom we refer for further details. Comparing
olumns (3) and (4) shows that the gap between the market and
orecasted spreads (the forecast error) can be large and varies
igniﬁcantly across countries. Default risk for the peripheral Euro-
rea countries appears to be over-priced given their fundamentals.
onversely, the risk for several emerging markets, such as Brazil,
eru, Russia, the Philippines, and South Africa, is under-priced. Col-
mn  (5) reports the market-assessed default probability (including
he probability of debt restructuring) based on the CDS spread.5
s expected, this default probability is positively correlated with
he market CDS spread, the forecasted spread, and the sovereign
ond yield (column 6). Although the correlation between the yield
nd the market CDS spread is only .46, the literature suggests
hat the bond-yield CDS spread correlation varies signiﬁcantly
cross time and countries (Favero and Giavazzi, 2005; Calice et al.,
orthcoming).6
The main contribution of our paper is to link the price and quan-
ity of sovereign default insurance to the forecast error on the
rice of insurance. The theoretical model predicts that insurance
emand should be positively related to the absolute gap between
5 CMA  reports the cumulative default probability for the ﬁve-year period, calcu-
ated using a proprietary credit valuation model and sovereign CDS data.
6 We  also note that markets can quickly adjust their risk perceptions: the market-
ssessed default probability for Greece increased from 58% in December 2010 to 91%
n  September 2011; for Portugal, the default probability increased from 36% to 61%
n just three months.
t
d
b
b
a
t market-estimated probability of sovereign default (%) against the size of notional
d of December 2010. The ﬁtted line is weighted by the total government debt (in
he market-assessed and forecasted risks. Newly published data,
hich are presented in columns 7–11 of Table 1, enable us to test
he model. The average daily turnover of CDSs and the number of
rades per day from January–March 2011 are in columns 7–8. The
ata shows that market activity for sovereign CDS contracts differs
arkedly across countries and is positively associated with the size
f government debt. It is also correlated with the value of the stock
f outstanding CDS contracts measured by gross claims, net claims,
nd the number of contracts in columns 9–11.7 Fig. 1 plots the
elationship between the market-assessed default probability in
olumn 5 and gross CDSs outstanding relative to government debt.
lthough risk and insurance in Fig. 1 are positively correlated,8 it
s not a tight relationship.
Table 2 summarizes the results of cross-country regressions of
arket CDS activity on the size of public debt and the forecast
rrors.9 Since the model makes predictions for total trade in CDSs
ur main dependent variable is the stock of gross outstanding CDSs.
e begin by documenting a positive association between CDS hold-
ngs and government debt in column (1). In column (2) we  add
he forecasting errors. In columns (3)–(5) we control for measures
f the riskiness of the debt, including the bond yield, the fore-
asted risk and the default probability. Columns (6)–(8) add region
ummies and replace the dependent variable with two  turnover
easures: the value and the number of CDS contracts traded per
ay. Column (9) employs net rather than gross CDS outstanding as
he dependent variable.
The results show that total government debt is signiﬁcant at
he 1 percent level in all speciﬁcations. Increasing government
ebt by 1 percent is estimated to increase the daily CDS turnover
y 0.67 percent (column iv) and the notional gross and net CDS
7 The net claims are the value of outstanding CDSs after offsetting claims have
een netted out across issuing entities. See also The Economist (2010).
8 The slope of the regression line in Fig. 1 is signiﬁcant at the one percent level
nd  yields an R2 of .24.
9 Apart from the region dummies, default probability and number of CDS con-
racts traded per day; all variables discussed below are measured in logs.
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Table 2
CDS demand and the forecast error on the CDS spread.
CDS measure (1)Gross (2)Gross (3)Gross (4)Gross (5)Gross (6)Gross (7) Net (8)Turnover (9)No/day
Debt 0.512** 0.504** 0.581** 0.557** 0.515** 0.488** 0.559** 0.673** 5.640**
(0.086) (0.084) (0.065) (0.079) (0.079) (0.088) (0.066) (0.104) (0.975)
Mkt  < Frc spread 0.242** 0.137+ 0.126 0.178* 0.191* 0.1029* 0.239** 2.338+
(0.083) (0.072) (0.075) (0.077) (0.085) (0.048) (0.081) (1.266)
Mkt  > Frc spread 0.241** 0.184** 0.200** 0.149+ 0.179* 0.1278** 0.257** 2.880*
(0.071) (0.057) (0.057) (0.076) (0.085) (0.047) (0.083) (1.369)
Non  Euro OECD −0.628
(0.456)
High income −0.976*
NonOECD (0.408)
Middle income −0.473
(0.391)
Core Euro area −0.759**
(0.269)
Bond Yld 0.606**
(0.175)
Forc. spread 0.324**
(0.095)
Pr  (default) 0.0183*
(0.008)
Constant 21.46** 20.51** 19.28** 19.01** 20.52** 21.35** 18.39** 13.71** −25.96**
(0.426) (0.524) (0.489) (0.538) (0.453) (0.822) (0.360) (0.601) (8.097)
Observations 49 49 48 49 49 49 49 49 49
R-squared 0.491 0.599 0.679 0.641 0.623 0.628 0.756 0.623 0.539
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The omitted region is the peripheral euro area economies of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Mkt  < Frc spread is the absolute
value  of the market-assessed minus the forecasted CDS spread when negative. Mkt  > Frc in the market-assessed minus the forecasted CDS spread when positive.
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** p < 0.01.
+ p < 0.1.
utstanding by about 0.5 percent.10 The remaining columns show
hat both positive forecast errors (when the market-assessed risk
xceeds the forecasted risk) and negative errors (the opposite) are
ositively and signiﬁcantly related to outstanding CDSs. Adding
he controls for risk in columns (3)–(5) decreases the coefﬁcients
n the forecast errors, but both remain signiﬁcant. Compared to
olumn (1) adding the forecast errors in column (2) increases R2
rom 0.49 to 0.6. As noted, while the positive signs and signiﬁcance
f both forecast errors is consistent with the model of overconﬁ-
ent investors, it appears inconsistent with models of sovereign
isk under common investor beliefs. Additional robustness checks
available on request from the authors) also remain consistent with
he model. Nonetheless, given the small size of the dataset we
refer to interpret the evidence as supportive of the model but
entative. We  therefore hope to test the model in a larger dataset
n the future.
. Conclusion
We use a combination of a public debt model and new market
ata to understand the price and volume of international purchases
f insurance against sovereign default. The model assumes that
nvestors are overconﬁdent in their ability to beat the market. It
redicts a positive correlation between the error in forecasting
efault risk based on public information – the absolute difference
etween the market and forecasted CDS spreads – and trade in
efault insurance. We  ﬁnd preliminary support for this predic-
10 Since gross CDS outstanding are on average 12 times greater than net outstand-
ng,  the absolute effect is much larger for gross CDSs. While we  considered using net
ositions as the dependent variable throughout, large gross positions may  precisely
eﬂect that parties offset their previous positions due to the kind of heterogeneous
eliefs our theoretical model is trying to capture. Changing the dependent variable
o the net position leads to smaller and somewhat less signiﬁcant, but still positive
oefﬁcients on the forecast errors.
C
C
C
D
D
Fion in a newly available dataset on sovereign credit default swaps
CDSs): after controlling for the size of the public debt, the abso-
ute size of the gap between the actual and forecasted spreads is
ositively related to the value of outstanding CDSs. We  conclude
hat heterogeneous investor beliefs and overconﬁdence may  be
mportant in driving trade in CDSs.
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